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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL JORGENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN CLAY AND COMPANY, a 
corporation, and AETNA 
CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Ca::;e No. 17621 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
VENUE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID IN SANPETE COUNTY 
AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDAl~TS' MOTION FOR 
CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Respondent argues that §78-13-6, U.C.A. is the correct 
venue statute to be applied in this action. (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 19-25). In the alternative, Respondent states 
that even assuming arguendo that §78-13-4, U.C.A. is appli-
cable as advocated by Appellants that statute also requires 
venue to be laid in Sanpete County. (Respondent's Brief, 
p. 26-29). Both of these arguments, howver, are erroneous. 
Under no circumstances can §78-13-6, U .C .A. be applicable 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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to this case. It states that "all transitory causes of 
action arising without this state in favor of residents of 
this state shall, if action is brought thereon in this state, 
be brought and tried in the county where the plaintiff 
rcridcs or in the county where the principal defendant 
resides. . (Emphasis added). 
Respondent argues that the instant case is a "transitory 
action" (Respondent's Brief, p. 21-22). Appellants certainly 
do not contest this statement and, in fact, would add that 
all contracts are transitory in their nature as opposed to 
local actions involving real property. Thus, the word "transi-
tory" adds nothing to the interpretation now being advocated 
by Respondent. 
The cause of action in this case did not "arise in Colorado" 
as claimed by Respondent. (Respondent's Brief, p. 22). Citing 
the same authority relied upon by Respondent, "a cause of 
action is said to arise generally at the place where the ac.t 
creating the right to bring an action occurred." 77 Arn. Jur.2d 
§37. (Emphasis added). The phrase "transitory causes of 
action arising" is different from phrases referring to "where 
the injury occurred which is then the place at which point 
the damage or wrongful act took place." Id. 
Based upon the jury's verdict, the injury or wrong 
occurred in Co~orado. The jury found that the defendant had 
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wrongfully failed to comply with the terms of the contract 
by not accepting the lambs in Colorado--the injury, there-
fore, occurred in Colorado. However, the right to bring 
the lawsuit was acquired in Utah since this is where the 
written contracts between the parties were made. ( l<O' spon-
dent's Brief, p. 20). Thus, the cause of action in this 
case arose within the state of Utah and §78-13-6 is therefuu 
completely inapplicable. 
This Court in Buckle v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 
216 P. 684 (Utah 1923) established the rule that all written 
contracts are to be governed by the predecessor of §78-13-4, 
U.C.A. This section allows a plaintiff to sue a defendant 
either in the county in which the defendant resides or in 
the county in which the contract is to be performed. As 
to all other types of contracts not in writing defendants 
"are not authorized to be tried out of the county where the 
defendant resides." 
The Court in Buckle specifically referred to contractu~ 
actions as "transitory" when it stated that the "general 
modern tendency is to fix the venue of transitory actions at 
the residence of the defendant." 216 P. at 685. 
This Court subsequently in Atlas Acceptance Corp.,~, 
Palfreyman, and Simmons has consistently held that if a 
plaintiff is unable to prove from the face of the written 
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agreement the place of performance then the correct venue 
is at the defendant's residence. (See discussion of cases 
in Appellants' Brief in chief, p. 17-21). These decisions 
are in no way modified by the Court's decision in Dee v. 
San Pedro referred to by the respondent. 
In Dee, the purported bona fide assignee of a cause of 
action for damages brought suit in the county of his resi-
dence, Weber County, for injuries to certain horses trans-
ported by the defendant railroad company, which had its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County. The 
defendant railroad moved for a change of venue on the 
grounds that §2932 and §2933 of Chapter 93, Session Laws 
of Utah 1913, controlled venue. 
The court indicated that defendant's motion was regular 
and sufficient, as the case stood then, to have entitled the 
defendant to have the action transferred to Salt Lake County. 
However, before the Weber County court ruled in the defendant's 
motion for change of venue, the plaintiff obtained permission 
to amend its Complaint to allege that the cause of action 
arose outside the State of Utah, in the states of Nevada 
and California. Plaintiff's amendment brought the case within 
the provisions of the statute, and the plaintiff elected, 
as provided in the statute, to bring the action in the 
county where he resided. The defendant renewed its motion 
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for a change of venue. 
The determinative venue issues in Dee were in the naturs 
of standing questions: whether the plaintiff was a bona 
fide assignee of the cause of action and resident of Weber 
County in whose favor the transitory cause of action arose; 
whether the person in whose favor the cause of action arose 
was a resident of Weber County. When the defendant had 
renewed its motion for change of venue, it had omitted to 
negative the plaintiff's assertion in his Amended Complaint 
that he was a bona fide assignee of the cause of action and 
the plaintiff's assertion in his Amended Complaint that the 
person in whose favor the cause of action arose was a resi-
dent of Weber County. Having failed to negative the "standi~:: 
allegations in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, defendant's 
motion for change of venue was denied. Here, proper affi-
davits were timely filed by Defendants and therefore no 
standing question is presented. 
The Dee case does not modify the rule established in 
the previously cited cases that in the abaence of express 
terms of a written contract showing the place of performance 
this Court will require suit to be brought in the county of 
the defendant. Respondent argues, however, that the place 
of performance can be implied from the contract, from the 
course of dealings, and from the Federal Packers and Stock-
-5-
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yards Act that the place of performance is Sanpete County. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 26-29). Appellants would dispute 
that an implication obtained outside of the document itself 
can be utilized in determining place of performance since 
plaintiffs in the previously cited cases also argued extcinsic 
evidence which was expressly rejected by this Court. See, 
for example, Palfreyman in which plaintiffs argued that the 
maintenance of an office implied performance in the county 
where the office was maintained. 
Assuming arguendo, however, that implications are proper 
Plaintiff's argument still is invalid. 
Respondent contradicts himself when he states that: 
. . . if the seller is not present to receive 
the check at the time of delivery of the sheep, 
the payment must be timely mailed first class, 
postage prepaid, and properly addressed to the 
seller. 7 U.S.C., §228b. Regs. of Sec. of 
Agriculture, Packers and Stockyards Act, 
9 C.F.R., Sec. 201.43. (Respondent's Brief, p. 27). 
Respondent's own statement reveals that Sanpete County was 
to be the place of performance by the payment obligation 
only if Respondent was not present to receive payment at 
the time of delivery in California or Colorado. 
In 1978, Respondent had been in the sheep business for 
more than twenty-five years, having raised and sold lambs 
for over ten years and having worked with appellant John Clay 
and Co. for four years. Respondent maintains that, "Advance 
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notice to the seller prior to shipping is clearly the 
accepted custom and practice in the livestock industry" 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 10). Respondent "wanted to see 
that his lambe were handled property" (Respondent's Brief, 
p. 9). 
Respondent testified to his numerous demands upon 
appellant John Clay and Co. for notice. (Tr. 81, 82, 84, 
143-44, 325, 619, 654-55). Respondent clearly intended to 
be present when appellant John Clay and Co. took delivery 
of the lambs. The livestock contract provided: "Balance 
of purchase price shall be paid when livestock are loaded 
on cars." Where the balance of the purchase price was to~ 
paid is specified in the Packers and Stockyards Act. 
Section 201.43 (b) (2) (ii) of the Act codifies the 
preferred practice in the livestock industry that the place 
of performance of the payment obligation is the place of 
delivery: 
No . . . dealer purchasing livestock for 
slaughter, shall mail a check in payment for 
the livestock unless (a) the check is made 
available for actual delivery and the seller 
or his duly authorized representative is not 
present to receive payment, at the point of 
transfer of possession of such livestock, on 
or before the close of the next business day 
following purchase of the livestock and trans-
fer of possession thereof .... 
Section 201. 43 (b) (2) (ii) expressly contemplates that 
the seller or his duly authorized representative may not be 
-7-
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present, in which case only shall payment be mailed to the 
sellers to such address as the seller may direct. Thus, 
the payment provision in the contracts herein could read 
as follows applying these implications: "Balance of purchase 
price sLetll be paid when ctnd where livestock are loaded on 
cars; and only if seller or his duly authorized representative 
is not then and there present shall payment be mailed forth-
with to the seller to such address as the seller may direct." 
Clearly, in accordance with the preferred and accepted custom 
and practice in the livestock industry, no one specific 
place can be made by necessary implication to appear from 
the express terms on the face of the livestock contract. 
The preferred and accepted custom and practice in the 
livestock industry is to notify the seller so that the 
seller can be present to see that the livestock are handled 
properly and so that the seller can be present to receive 
payment on the spot from the dealer. Under the circumstances 
it cannot have been said that the necessary implication 
made to appear from the express terms on the face of the 
livestock contract was that the place of performance of the 
payment obligation was Sanpete County, Utah. The most that 
could have been said, as Respondent himself has stated, was 
"that if payment for the sheep was not made to Plaintiff at 
the time and place of delivery in California or Colorado, 
-8-
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payment would be made by mailing to Plaintiff's residence 
in Sanpete County." (Respondent's Brief, p. 27). 
Utah law requires that the place of performance of 
obligation necessarily be made to appear by implication 
from the express terms on the fa~e of the contcact. Utah 
law does not say that venue may lie at any secondary or 
conditional place of payment which might be made by necessary 
implication to appear from the face of the written contract. 
California might have been the place for performance of the 
payment obligation; Colorado might have been the place for 
performance; Sanpete County might have been the place. No 
one specific and unconditional place for performance can 
have been made to appear by necessary implication from the 
express terms on the face of the contract. 
In summary, the cause of action in this case cannot 
be said under theory to have risen outside of the State of 
Utah and, in addition, all written transitory contractual 
actions are governed by §78-13-4, U.C.A. If the plaintiff 
is able to show a place of performance he is then able to 
bring an action in the county where the performance is to 
occur. In absence of an express showing of such performance 
by the terms of the contract itself, however, the traditional 
rule applies and defendant must be sued in his own county. 
Here, the lower court committed prejudicial error in failing 
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to follow this mandatory venue requirement. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN SUBMITTING THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
TO THE JURY At'JD IN SUBSEQUENTLY AWARDING 
ATTORNEYS' FEES WHEN THERE WAS NO BASIS 
UNDEP. UTAH LAW FOR SUCH AN INSTRUCTION. 
Respondent complained against John Clay and Co. for 
(1) alleged breach of contract obligation to take delivery 
of 6,283 lambs, and (2) alleged breach of a contract obligation 
to pay amounts due under the c6ntract. The livestock contracts 
contained no provision whatsoever for payment of attorneys' 
fees. The lower court awarded some $20,000 in attorneys' 
fees based upon the jury's finding of $1.00 punitive damages. 
In breach of contract actions, attorneys' fees can be 
considered as an element of damages only in those cases 
in which exemplary damages are awarded. DeBry & Hilton Travel 
v. Capital International Airways, 538 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978). 
In DeBry, the plaintiff prayed for punitive damages and 
attorneys' fees by reason of the defendant's malicious conduct, 
and by reason of the defendant's bad faith in its conduct 
toward the plaintiff. An award of punitive damages was 
denied, and thus the trial court properly denied counsel fees. 
In affirming the lower court's denial of attorneys' fees, this 
Court cited Dahl v. Prince, 230 P.2d 328 (Utah 1951) in 
which the Court had reversed an award of attorneys' fees 
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"where there was no basis for an award of punitive damages." 
583 P.2d at 1185. Appellants dispute the propriety of punitiv: 
damages in this action for breach of contract. Appellants 
submit that there was no basis for an award of even $1.00 
in punitive damages. 
On page 31 of his brief, Respondent states: 
Even the case of Lyman Grazing Association 
v. Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 473 P.2d 905 (1970) 
cited by Appellants states that attorneys' fees 
are appropriate upon a showing of fraud, malice 
or wantonness such as would sustain an award of 
punitive damages. 473 P.2d at 908. 
Lyman was a suit for injunctive relief, not a suit for 
loss of bargain. This Court stated the rule in whole: 
It is a well-established rule that a court 
although awarding affirmative injunctive relief 
to a plaintiff or complinant, will not award 
attorneys' fees in the absence of a showing of 
such fraud, malice or wantonness as would authorize 
an award of punitive damages. . . . 473 P.2d at 
908. 
Respondent confuses the rule in an action for injunctive 
relief in an equitable proceeding such as Lyman, with the 
contract law principle of: 
... "just compensation" which requires 
only that a plaintiff be placed in the same 
position he would have occupied but for the 
breach. Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 2d 
339, 352, 241 P.2d 914, 920 (1952). 
This distinction has been stated as follows: 
Thus, the defendant's motive for a breach 
is generally deemed irrelevant . . . unless one 
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b 
who holds himself out to the community to perform 
special services, such as a lawyer, trust company, 
or realtor, assumes fiduciary duties which, if 
breached, subject him to punitive damages as a 
matter of public policy and recovery of punitive 
damages is improper unless the plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the willful and malicious nature 
of the defendant's breach constitutes an independent 
tort. 1979 Utah Law Rev., 369. (Emphasis added). 
Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978) appears 
at first blush to suggest a departure from the long-standing 
rule in Utah of "just compensation" in actions for breach of 
contract. The Court indicated, however, that the defendant 
there owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty to act in good 
faith and to deal fairly with the plaintiff. One conunentator 
has stated with reference to Nash: 
The defendant's breach of this duty was 
apparently the key to the court's determination 
that a jury might reasonably conclude that the 
defendant acted willfully and maliciously. 
Implicit in the court's reasoning should be 
the notion that a willful and malicious breach of 
contract, sufficient to justify an award of 
punitive damages, can result when a fiduciary duty 
exists between the parties that is apart from and 
in addition to their contractual duties. 
Nash, therefore, should not be construed to 
include in its sweep every intentional breach. 
Efficiency in the marketplace results from 
permitting a party to breach a contract if he 
can obtain a more favorable bargain elsewhere. 
The right to breach should be allowed as long 
as the non-breaching party receives the equivalent 
of performance. The rule of "just compensation" 
should continue to be the ceiling for the breach 
of contractual duties. 1979 Utah Law Rev., 370. 
Appellant John Clay and Co. owed Respondent no fiduciary 
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duty under the livestock contracts. Respondent neither 
alleged nor proved any independent tort to have been 
committed by appellant John Clay and Co. Respondent 
neither alleged nor proved that appellant John Clay and 
Co. committed any fraud. There was no basis for an award 
of punitive damages in the case at bar. 
Respondent claims that appellant John Clay and Co. 
breached its duty under the livestock contracts to act in 
good faith toward Respondent, and that appellant John Clay 
and Co. 's alleged breach of such a duty entitled him to 
punitive damages. Respondent, however, cites no law wherein 
breach of an alleged duty to act in good faith has been the 
basis for an award of punitive damages. 
Zions' Properties v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975), 
is inapposite, because the implied contract covenant there 
concerned a covenant of good faith and cooperation preventing 
either party to a contract from rendering it difficult or 
impossible for the other party to continue performance and 
then taking advantage of the non-performance he has caused. 
Respondent did not claim that John Clay rendered it difficult 
or impossible for Respondent to continue performance, and 
that John Clay and Co. sought to take advantage of any non-
performance on Respondent's part. If anything, appellant 
John Clay and Co. claimed that Respondent breached his covenan' 
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of good faith and cooperation by rendering it difficult or 
impossible for John Clay and Co. to take delivery of the 
lambs before they became too heavy. 
In support of his claim that a breach of a duty to 
act in good faith can be the basis for an aword of punitive 
damages, Respondent cites three cases concerning the common 
legal principle that in every insurance contract there is 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Gruenberg 
v. Aetna Insurance Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032, 
1037 (1973); Garrett v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 
520 S.W.2d 102, 121 (Mo. App.); First Security Bank of 
Bozeman v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Mont. 1979). The 
case at bar does not concern an insurance contract. 
On pages 35 and 36 of his brief, Respondent sets forth 
"evidence" of appellant John Clay and Co.'s "attitude of 
reckless disregard for Plaintiff's right to be treated 
honestly and fairly under the contract." Respondent simply 
recounts matters going to the alleged breach of contract and 
matters going to "attempted" wrongful conduct on the part of 
appellant John Clay and Co. Respondent does not set forth 
egregious conduct akin to selling brucellosis infected 
cattle (Kiser v. Gilmore, 2 Kan. App.2d 638, 587 P.2d 911 
(1979); or refusing to pay a valid health insurance claim 
(Curtiss v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 90 N.M. App. 1976); 
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or fraudulently falsifying weight records (Whitehead v. 
Allen, 36 N.M. 63, 313 P.2d 335 (1957). 
Respondent neither alleged nor proved any breach of a 
fiduciary duty, any independent tort, or any fraud. No 
grounds under Utah law were alleged or proved '''. ··rn which an 
award of punitive damages could be based. Respondent sued 
for breach of contract to recoup his loss of bargain. It 
cannot be said that Appellants' defense of this action was 
withollt merit or good faith. It would not comport with this 
Court's ideas of either law or justice to assess Appellants 
attorney fees for entertaining bona fide questions about hls 
legal obligations and seeking adjudication thereon in the 
courts of this State. Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. 
Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980). 
Communist countries assess a fine against a defaulting 
promiser, payable to the injured promisee, as a "form of 
social criticism." In contrast, courts in this country, as 
in most of the rest of the world, expressly reject the notion 
that remedies for breach of contract have punishment as a 
goal, and with rare exceptions, refuse to grant "punitive 
damages" for breach of contract. "Legal Remedies for 
Breach of Contract," 70 Columbia Law Rev., 1146. 
On pages 37-38 of his brief, Respondent states that 
"[P)unitive damages are often necessary to fully compensate 
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the plaintiff, particularly if the economic bargaining power 
of the plaintiff is inferior to the 'oppressors' (i.e., 
defendants Clay and Monfort.}" To assess punitive damages 
against appellant John Clay and Co. in this case would be 
contrary to ali l· ~nciples of contract law and past decisions 
by this Court. This Court must reverse the award of $1.00 
as punitive damages, since there is no evidence even for 
this nominal award. 
In addition, of course, the $21,400.00 attorney fees 
and costs is totally unjustified even assuming arguendo 
punitive damages are proper since the fees are some 20,000 
times the punitive damages awarded. The trial court 
conunitted prejudicial error in submitting the issue of puni-
tive damages to the jury and in subsequently awarding 
attorneys' fees when there was no basis under Utah law for 
such award. 
POINT III 
THE AMOUNT OF RESPONDENT'S ALLEGED LOSS 
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MEASURED BY FACTS AND 
FIGURES ASCERTAINABLE PRIOR TO JUDGMENT 
AND THUS THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF 
PREJUDMENT INTEREST WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Four questions were presented to the jury for resolution 
which had a direct bearing on the issue of damages: 
1. Did Respondent unduly delay the shipment of lambs 
and thus precipitate Monfort's refusal to take delivery of 
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Respondent's overweight lambs from John Clay and Co.? 
2. Did Respondent's undue delay, if any, contribute to 
unnecessary weight gain for which Respondent sought to charge 
Appellant John Clay and Co.? 
3. How much weight did the lambs gain 11:rn0cessarily? 
4. Did Respondent mitigate his losses by accepting the 
most commercially reasonable offer for the 6,283 lambs? 
The answers to these questions had a direct bearing on 
the "date certain" upon which damages should have been 
computed and the standards of value which should have been 
used to ascertain damages. 
Clearly, if Respondent unduly delayed shipment and 
caused Monfort's refusal to take the lambs, then no damages 
should properly have been assessed against appellants John 
Clay and Co. or Aetna. If Respondent unduly delayed 
shipment and precipitated Monfort's refusal to take the 
lambs, the Appellants should not have been assessed for 
the weight gained by the time the lambs were finally sold to 
R. H. Rock. If R. H. Rock's offer of $70.20 per head 
($70.20/hd. x 6,283 hd. = $441,066.60) was not commercially 
reasonable compared to appellant John Clay and Co. 's offer 
of $.66 per pound up to 120 pounds ($.66/lb. x 120 lbs. x 
6,283 lambs $497,613.60) then Appellants should not have 
been assessed the $56,547.00 difference. 
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The amount of the loss for which Respondent sought 
prejudgment interest could not have been measured by facts 
and figures ascertainable at any particular fixed time 
prior to judgment, nor calculable with mathematical accuracy. 
The a~10ctllt of damages must necessarily have been ascertained 
and assessed by the trier of fact at the trial, and thus 
prejudgment interest properly should not have been awarded. 
Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977). 
This matter should therefore be remanded to the lower court 
for entry of prejudgment interest as to the freight and 274 
lambs only. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent failed to establish that this action fell 
within any one of the statutory exceptions to the general 
rule that persons sued have the right to have the action 
brought and tried in the county in which they reside or in 
which, as here, they maintain their principal and only place 
of business. The failure to allow suit to be tried in the 
correct county was reversible error. 
Respondent neither alleged nor proved that appellant 
John Clay and Co. breached any fiduciary duty, committed any 
intentional tort, or perpetrated any fraud. Respondent 
merely alleged and endeavored to prove that appellant John 
Clay and Co. breached the livestock contracts. No basis 
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existed under Utah law for the trial court to submit the 
issue of punitive damages to the ~ury; the trial court's 
award of attorneys' fees and litigation costs to Respondent 
was prejudicial and improper. Respondent was entitled to 
"just compensation" only for appellant John Clay and Co. 's 
alleged breach of contract. 
In order for any "date certain" or "standards of val~" 
to have been used to calculate damages, it was necessary first I 
for the jury to make certain of factual findings concerning 
any undue delay in delivery caused by Respondent and whether 
Respondent mitigated his losses in the most corrunercially 
reasonable manner. The amount of loss for which Respondent 
sought prejudgment interest could not have been measured 
by facts and figures ascertainable at any particular fixed 
time prior to judgment, nor calculable with mathematical 
accuracy. The trial court's award of prejudgment interest 
regarding the 6,283 lambs was erroneous and constituted 
prejudicial error. The award should be vacated. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the judgment below 
should be vacated and a new trial ordered. In the alterna-
tive, the award of punitive damages, attorneys' fees and 
prejudgment interest should be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard Stein 
Richard Campbell 
STEIN & CAMPBELL 
Craig S. Cook 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appellants • 
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